Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.005zbMath1400.91010OpenAlexW2615908764MaRDI QIDQ1651236

John Rehbeck

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumseparable gamescontinuous gamespolynomial games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

Multiple oracle algorithm to solve continuous games

Cites Work

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• A note on polynomial and separable games
• Separable and low-rank continuous games
• Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Computing generalized Nash equilibria by polynomial programming
• The testable implications of zero-sum games
• A Polynomial Optimization Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

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