Rationalizability and logical inference

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.006zbMath1400.91096OpenAlexW2803547309WikidataQ57935159 ScholiaQ57935159MaRDI QIDQ1651238

Dieter Balkenborg

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

modal logicnecessitationrationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The logic of backward induction
• On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
• Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• On the evaluation of solution concepts
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• Game theory and mutual misunderstanding. Scientific dialogues in five acts. Translated by Ruth Vanbaelen and Mamoru Kaneko.
• Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• First-order modal logic
• Reasoning about rationality
• The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
• Game logic and its applications. I
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• The Many Faces of Rationalizability
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Admissibility in Games

This page was built for publication: Rationalizability and logical inference