Matching in the large: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.004zbMath1400.91370OpenAlexW3013045810MaRDI QIDQ1651242

Y. Aharonov

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

experimentmatchingschool choicescale

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse ⋮ Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study ⋮ Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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