To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.014zbMath1400.91103OpenAlexW2766031503MaRDI QIDQ1651245

Ned Augenblick, Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.014

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationprivacydynamic communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Dynamic persuasion ⋮ Anonymous Stochastic Routing ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals

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• Is privacy compatible with truthfulness?
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• Long Cheap Talk
• Coarse Matching

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