Balanced externalities and the Shapley value

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006zbMath1400.91028OpenAlexW2794724046MaRDI QIDQ1651257

Robert Sugden, Ben McQuillin

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66630/4/Accepted_manuscript.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuebalanced contributionssemivaluescoalitional bargainingmerge-externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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