The proportional Shapley value and applications
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Publication:1651258
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.010zbMath1400.91013OpenAlexW2519875705MaRDI QIDQ1651258
Sylvain Ferrières, Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.010
Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (17)
Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items ⋮ Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions ⋮ Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value ⋮ The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies ⋮ Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value ⋮ Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value ⋮ Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions ⋮ Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values ⋮ Modelling coalitions: from concept formation to tailoring empirical explanations ⋮ Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games ⋮ Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution ⋮ The Shapley value, the proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures ⋮ Compromising between the proportional and equal division values ⋮ Axiomatizations of the proportional division value ⋮ Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
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