Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
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Publication:1651260
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.09.004zbMath1400.91036OpenAlexW2755754272MaRDI QIDQ1651260
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.004
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Cites Work
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