Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.005zbMath1400.91389OpenAlexW3123755402MaRDI QIDQ1651269

René van den Brink, Jia-Ping Huang, Simin He

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/0de14c0b-8627-4fd4-bc3d-8809ddb40c31

zbMATH Keywords

cost sharingaxiomatizationpermission valuespolluted river

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (8)

Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games ⋮ Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure ⋮ A game-theoretic multi-stakeholder model for cost allocation in urban consolidation centres ⋮ Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river ⋮ Cost allocation in energy distribution networks ⋮ Sharing the costs of cleanup polluted river: upstream compensation method ⋮ Responsibility and sharing the cost of cleaning a polluted river ⋮ Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility

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