The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.005zbMath1400.91368OpenAlexW2645222273MaRDI QIDQ1651273

Paolo Pin, Leonardo Boncinelli

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2158/1093363

zbMATH Keywords

graphmatchingstochastic stabilitymaximum matchingmaximal matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

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Cites Work

• Stochastic stability in best shot network games
• Stochastic stability for roommate markets
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• Maximal Flow Through a Network
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• The Complexity of Enumeration and Reliability Problems
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Paths, Trees, and Flowers
• An $n^{5/2} $ Algorithm for Maximum Matchings in Bipartite Graphs
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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