Competitive equilibria in school assignment

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.003zbMath1400.91372OpenAlexW2765437838MaRDI QIDQ1651277

Thayer Morrill, Umut Mert Dur

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriaschool choicetop trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action ⋮ Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case

Cites Work

• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• Making just school assignments
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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