Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.002zbMath1400.91369OpenAlexW2775021204MaRDI QIDQ1651284

Yi-Yi Chen, Yi-Cheng Kao, Wei-Cheng Chen

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

matchingexperimentsearly decisionsimultaneous screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The dynamics of law clerk matching: an experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: an experimental investigation
• On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms
• Simultaneous screening and college admissions
• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
• Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets

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