Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.011zbMath1400.91380OpenAlexW3124204936MaRDI QIDQ1651286

Alex Rees-Jones

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.011

zbMATH Keywords

matchingdeferred acceptance algorithmsuboptimal behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (14)

Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof ⋮ Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse ⋮ Fair cake-cutting in practice ⋮ Parallel markets in school choice ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Interview hoarding ⋮ Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms ⋮ Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism ⋮ Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment ⋮ Cognitive ability and games of school choice ⋮ Self-selection in school choice ⋮ Level-k reasoning in school choice ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance ⋮ Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment

Cites Work

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• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
• Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
• Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• School choice: an experimental study
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Strategy-proofness in the Large
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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