The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1651290
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.014zbMath1400.91019OpenAlexW2795835285MaRDI QIDQ1651290
Jane Friedman, Cameron C. Parker
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.014
cooperative gamesShapley-Shubik indexordinal equivalenceternary voting gamespostulates of power measures
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- The influence relation for ternary voting games
- Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
- Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
- On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
- A class of simple games
- Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Ternary voting games
- Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
- Valuing inputs under supply uncertainty: the Bayesian Shapley value
- Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
- The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
- Abstentions in the German Bundesrat and ternary decision rules in weighted voting systems
- The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
