Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
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Publication:1651297
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.006zbMath1400.91015OpenAlexW2621346785WikidataQ123086820 ScholiaQ123086820MaRDI QIDQ1651297
Zhigang Cao, Xiao-guang Yang, Cheng-Zhong Qin
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.006
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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