Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.006zbMath1400.91015OpenAlexW2621346785WikidataQ123086820 ScholiaQ123086820MaRDI QIDQ1651297

Zhigang Cao, Xiao-guang Yang, Cheng-Zhong Qin

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.006

zbMATH Keywords

corecomplementssubstitutesconvex gamesassignment games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes ⋮ A note on submodularity preserved involving the rank functions

Cites Work

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