Zero-sum revision games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.004zbMath1400.91042OpenAlexW2594412971MaRDI QIDQ1651301

Stefano Lovo, Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala, Fabien Gensbittel

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

zero-sum gamesdeadline effectrevision games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (4)

Dynamic equilibrium with randomly arriving players ⋮ Characterizing agent behavior in revision games with uncertain deadline ⋮ Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies ⋮ The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities

Cites Work

• The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation
• Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
• Stochastic Games

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