On a class of vertices of the core

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.001zbMath1400.91020OpenAlexW3030435375MaRDI QIDQ1651303

Peter Sudhölter, Michel Grabisch

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

coreTU gamesvertexgame with precedence constraintsrestricted cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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