Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.011zbMath1400.91301OpenAlexW2792827728MaRDI QIDQ1651304

Joseph M. Ostroy

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/94z4613j

zbMATH Keywords

subdifferentialcoremarket gameWalrasian equilibriumassignment modelperfect substitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

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• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• A characterization of perfectly competititve economies with production
• The no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium
• Differentiability as convergence to perfectly competitive equilibrium
• Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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