Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.002zbMath1400.91035OpenAlexW2613277224MaRDI QIDQ1651308

Jingang Zhao

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

coreShapleymultiobjective gameserror in game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (12)

Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games ⋮ On balanced games with infinitely many players: revisiting Schmeidler's result ⋮ Sharing a collective probability of success ⋮ Equal treatment without large numbers ⋮ Rationalizability in multicriteria games ⋮ On stability of collaborative supplier selection ⋮ Gain-sharing in urban consolidation centers ⋮ On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium ⋮ Unawareness of decision criteria in multicriteria games ⋮ A cost sharing example in which subsidies are necessary for stability ⋮ Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations ⋮ Decision making and games with vector outcomes

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