Optimal patent policy in the presence of vertical separation

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2018.03.027zbMath1403.91149OpenAlexW3123645509WikidataQ130061105 ScholiaQ130061105MaRDI QIDQ1651728

Michi Nishihara, Haejun Jeon

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.03.027

zbMATH Keywords

real optionsOR in research and developmentpatent policyvertical separationlicense bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (4)

Demand uncertainty, product differentiation, and entry timing under spatial competition ⋮ Game modes and investment cost locations in radio-frequency identification (RFID) adoption ⋮ Comparative advantage with many goods: new treatment and results ⋮ Licensing and information disclosure under asymmetric information

Cites Work

• Optimal exercise of jointly held real options: a Nash bargaining approach with value diversion
• Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty
• Co-development ventures: optimal time of entry and profit-sharing
• On the optimal mix of patent instruments
• Bargaining with revoking costs
• Royalty licensing
• Patent litigation and cross licensing with cumulative innovation
• Licensing and information disclosure under asymmetric information
• A real options game of alliance timing decisions in biopharmaceutical research and development
• Real options in operations research: a review
• Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information
• Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R\&D licensing contracts
• Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing

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