Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2018.04.001zbMath1403.90564OpenAlexW2795845210MaRDI QIDQ1651735

Martin Bichler, Soeren Merting

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

multi-agent systemsauctions/biddingapproximation mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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