Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods

DOI10.3390/G6020124zbMath1404.91102OpenAlexW3124412353MaRDI QIDQ1651788

Alexander Isakov, Daria Roithmayr, David G. Rand

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6020124

zbMATH Keywords

institutionscooperationpunishmentsocial evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor

Cites Work

• Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
• Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
• The evolution of coercive institutional punishment
• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games

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