How moral codes evolve in a trust game

DOI10.3390/g6020150zbMath1402.91058OpenAlexW1518671227MaRDI QIDQ1651789

Y. Aharonov

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6020150

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityprisoner's dilemmamoral codes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

A new evolutionary game analysis for industrial pollution management considering the central Government's punishment

Uses Software

• Dynamo

Cites Work

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• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Which one should I imitate?
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
• Equilibrium vengeance
• Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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