The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality

DOI10.3390/g6030191zbMath1404.91122OpenAlexW1554333118MaRDI QIDQ1651793

Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc, Ernan E. Haruvy

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030191

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsauctions with price externalitybidder aggressionunderbidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
• Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?
• An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions
• Charitable Motives and Bidding in Charity Auctions