The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations

DOI10.3390/g6030231zbMath1402.91062OpenAlexW1490459657MaRDI QIDQ1651796

Alexander J. Stewart, Joshua B. Plotkin

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030231

zbMATH Keywords

evolvabilitycooperationadaptive dynamicsiterated gamesevolution of investmentmemory-1 strategiespayoff evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Equal Pay for All Prisoners
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
• From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

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