Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation

DOI10.3390/G6030262zbMath1402.91032OpenAlexW1866166291MaRDI QIDQ1651800

Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, Eva M. Krockow

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030262

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationreciprocitybackward inductioncentipede gameend-game effectstake-it-or-leave-it game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• On the centipede game
• Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
• A payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games
• On the validity of the random lottery incentive system
• Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
• Best-reply matching in games.
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas
• An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
• Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games

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