Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1651817
DOI10.3390/g6040438zbMath1402.91056OpenAlexW1834348393MaRDI QIDQ1651817
Martin A. Nowak, Whan Ghang, Jason W. Olejarz
Publication date: 10 July 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040438
Related Items
A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity ⋮ A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
- Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite asymmetric two-deme population and emergence of cooperation
- Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
- Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
- Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
- The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
- Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
- The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- The Calculus of Selfishness