Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information

DOI10.3390/g6040438zbMath1402.91056OpenAlexW1834348393MaRDI QIDQ1651817

Martin A. Nowak, Whan Ghang, Jason W. Olejarz

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040438

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary dynamicsindirect reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity ⋮ A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
• Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite asymmetric two-deme population and emergence of cooperation
• Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
• Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• The conflict of social norms may cause the collapse of cooperation: indirect reciprocity with opposing attitudes towards in-group favoritism
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• The Calculus of Selfishness