Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution

DOI10.3390/G6040574zbMath1402.91059OpenAlexW1926119587MaRDI QIDQ1651830

Satoshi Uchida, Xiaojie Chen, Isamu Okada, Tatsuya Sasaki

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040574

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentevolution of cooperationpeer punishmentpool punishmentrefundable deposit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay ⋮ Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory ⋮ Does spending more always ensure higher cooperation? An analysis of institutional incentives on heterogeneous networks ⋮ Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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