Evidential equilibria: heuristics and biases in static games of complete information

DOI10.3390/g6040637zbMath1402.91082OpenAlexW2176984127MaRDI QIDQ1651837

Ali al-Nowaihi, Sanjit Dhami

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040637

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydecision makingevidential reasoningcognitive biasoligopoly gamesprisoners' dilemma gameconservative heuristicsradical heuristics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Equilibrium as compatibility of plans ⋮ Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games

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