Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty: an experiment

DOI10.3390/G7010002zbMath1403.91094OpenAlexW2221532954MaRDI QIDQ1651840

Marc Willinger, Klarizze Anne Puzon

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7010002

zbMATH Keywords

natural resourcescontestsconflictlaboratory experimentsgovernanceparadox of the plenty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings
• The effect of stakes in distribution experiments
• Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?
• Power, growth, and the voracity effect

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