Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining

DOI10.3390/G7020012zbMath1402.91018OpenAlexW2379365644MaRDI QIDQ1651856

Antoni Rubí-Barceló, Daniel Cardona

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020012

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaone-dimensionaltime preferencemultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games of timing (91A55)

Cites Work

• Sequential share bargaining
• Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
• Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification
• The unique perfect equilibrium of an \(n\)-person bargaining game
• Demand bargaining in legislatures
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Alliances and negotiations
• On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences

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