Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: bigger is not necessarily better

DOI10.3390/g9010004zbMath1403.91093OpenAlexW2785151391MaRDI QIDQ1651864

Graham Loomes, Briony D. Pulford, Andrew M. Colman

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010004

zbMATH Keywords

experimental gamesincentivescrowding outcapital-labor-production frameworkincentive elasticity of effortreasons for choices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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