Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology

DOI10.3390/g9010006zbMath1404.91143OpenAlexW2787992800MaRDI QIDQ1651871

Davide Ticchi, Marco A. Marini, Paolo Polidori, Désirée Teobaldelli

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010006

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionincentivesprincipal-agentendogenous technology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

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• The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

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