Game of thrones: accommodating monetary policies in a monetary union

DOI10.3390/G9010009zbMath1405.91429OpenAlexW2776526015WikidataQ130205721 ScholiaQ130205721MaRDI QIDQ1651876

Dmitri Blueschke, Reinhard Neck

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010009

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsmacroeconomicsmonetary uniondynamic gamepublic debtPareto solutionfeedback Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

Should fiscal policies be centralized in a monetary union? A dynamic game approach

Uses Software

• OPTGAME3

Cites Work

• Dynamic modelling of monetary and fiscal cooperation among nations
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• How important is fiscal policy cooperation in a currency union?
• OPTGAME3: A Dynamic Game Solver and an Economic Example
• Fiscal Devaluations
• Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions*

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