The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent

DOI10.3390/g9010012zbMath1404.91142OpenAlexW2567056335MaRDI QIDQ1651880

Lionel Thomas, François Maréchal

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010012

zbMATH Keywords

prudencerisk aversionmoral hazardadverse selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items

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Cites Work

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• Risk-aversion, prudence and temperance
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
• On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment

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