Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation

DOI10.3390/g9010015zbMath1404.91129OpenAlexW3124754759WikidataQ130129764 ScholiaQ130129764MaRDI QIDQ1651886

Juan D. Carrillo, Isabelle Brocas, F. Javier Otamendi

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010015

zbMATH Keywords

selectionsequential auctionslaboratory experimentcapacity constraintsoverbidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: an experimental study
• Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
• Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
• The declining price anomaly
• Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!
• Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

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