A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation
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Publication:1652564
DOI10.1016/j.cor.2017.09.024zbMath1394.91166OpenAlexW2760415932MaRDI QIDQ1652564
Publication date: 11 July 2018
Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/8206
Mixed integer programming (90C11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature ⋮ Effects of production capacity and substitutability on optimal pricing and inventory policies
Cites Work
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
- Understanding auctions
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- Capacity Choice and Allocation: Strategic Behavior and Supply Chain Performance
- Equilibrium analysis of capacity allocation with demand competition
- Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities
- Technical Note—Capacity Allocation Under Retail Competition: Uniform and Competitive Allocations
- Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
- On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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