A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation

DOI10.1016/j.cor.2017.09.024zbMath1394.91166OpenAlexW2760415932MaRDI QIDQ1652564

Selçuk Karabatı, Javad Lessan

Publication date: 11 July 2018

Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/8206

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit auctionsmixed-integer programmingpricing and capacity allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mixed integer programming (90C11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature ⋮ Effects of production capacity and substitutability on optimal pricing and inventory policies

Cites Work

• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
• Understanding auctions
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• Capacity Choice and Allocation: Strategic Behavior and Supply Chain Performance
• Equilibrium analysis of capacity allocation with demand competition
• Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities
• Technical Note—Capacity Allocation Under Retail Competition: Uniform and Competitive Allocations
• Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
• On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

This page was built for publication: A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation