Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation

DOI10.1007/S00712-017-0547-3zbMath1402.91271OpenAlexW2613652067MaRDI QIDQ1652811

Juan Perote-Peña, Francisco Candel-Sánchez

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0547-3

zbMATH Keywords

signalingasymmetric informationlobby formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency

Cites Work

• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Common Agency
• Sequential Equilibria

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