An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications
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Publication:1652814
DOI10.1007/s00712-017-0559-zzbMath1402.91304OpenAlexW2740093589MaRDI QIDQ1652814
Susumu Sato, Toshihiro Matsumura, Sang-Ho Lee
Publication date: 16 July 2018
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80146/8/MSL20170712.pdf
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- HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*
