Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship

DOI10.1007/S00712-017-0563-3zbMath1402.91181OpenAlexW2582916657MaRDI QIDQ1652824

Shohei Yoshida

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0563-3

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powerprofitNash bargainingfirm asymmetryvertical relationship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (4)

Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices ⋮ Price versus quantity competition in a vertically related market with retailer's effort ⋮ The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology ⋮ Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market

Cites Work

• The countervailing power hypothesis in the dominant firm-competitive fringe model
• Raising rivals' cost through buyer power
• Interlocking cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly: when social welfare benefits from ``more collusion
• Pricing and market conduct in a vertical relationship
• Pass-through, vertical contracts, and bargains
• The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices
• Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?
• Labour union, entry and consumer welfare
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data

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