OPAQUE: an asymmetric PAKE protocol secure against pre-computation attacks
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Publication:1653103
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_15zbMath1415.94443OpenAlexW2795336163MaRDI QIDQ1653103
Jiayu Xu, Hugo Krawczyk, Stanislaw Jarecki
Publication date: 17 July 2018
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_15
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