OPAQUE: an asymmetric PAKE protocol secure against pre-computation attacks

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Publication:1653103

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_15zbMath1415.94443OpenAlexW2795336163MaRDI QIDQ1653103

Jiayu Xu, Hugo Krawczyk, Stanislaw Jarecki

Publication date: 17 July 2018

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_15




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