Information disclosure strategies for the intermediary and competitive sellers
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Publication:1653401
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2018.06.037zbMath1403.90459OpenAlexW2809714136WikidataQ129601918 ScholiaQ129601918MaRDI QIDQ1653401
Kin Keung Lai, Gang Li, John W. K. Leung, Tao Zhang
Publication date: 3 August 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.06.037
Related Items (6)
Information disclosure in a supply chain with copycat threat ⋮ Optimal software free trial strategy with network effects in a platform supply chain ⋮ Blockchain's role in e-commerce sellers' decision-making on information disclosure under competition ⋮ Product reliability and extended warranty in supply chains ⋮ Fit revelation strategy in a supply chain with two types of consumers ⋮ Information acquisition and voluntary disclosure with supply chain and capital market interaction
Cites Work
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- A game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co-op advertising in manufacturer-retailer supply chains
- Consumer returns policies with endogenous deadline and supply chain coordination
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- Optimal decisions for sellers considering valuation bias and strategic consumer reactions
- Revenue Management with Partially Refundable Fares
- Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance
- Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers
- On the Value of Commitment and Availability Guarantees When Selling to Strategic Consumers
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- Optimal Preorder Strategy with Endogenous Information Control
- Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chains: A game theory approach
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