Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship

DOI10.1007/s00712-015-0456-2zbMath1408.91087OpenAlexW1952926738WikidataQ57998462 ScholiaQ57998462MaRDI QIDQ1654016

Raffaele Fiocco, Mario Gilli

Publication date: 7 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21070/1/466.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

regulationasymmetric informationbargainingcollusionauditing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
• Bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator
• Delay in bargaining games with complete information
• Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• The Bargaining Problem
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Collusion in Organizations
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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