Leniency programs under demand uncertainty: cartel stability and the duration of price wars

DOI10.1007/S00712-015-0466-0zbMath1408.91074OpenAlexW2280507578MaRDI QIDQ1654082

Konstantinos Charistos

Publication date: 7 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://aphrodite.uom.gr/econwp/pdf/dp082015.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusionantitrust enforcementprice warsleniency programs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• Are leniency programs too generous?
• Collusive behavior under a leniency program
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information

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