Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay

DOI10.1007/S00712-015-0454-4zbMath1408.91118OpenAlexW1908784793MaRDI QIDQ1654085

Jianye Yan, Pu Chen, Sanxi Li, Xundong Yin

Publication date: 7 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0454-4

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversioninnovation effortpower of incentiveproduction effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
• The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives

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