Optimal know-how transfers in licensing contracts

DOI10.1007/s00712-015-0468-yzbMath1408.91124OpenAlexW2206922027MaRDI QIDQ1654089

Jose J. Sempere-Monerris, Rafael Moner-Colonques, Pedro Mendi

Publication date: 7 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0468-y

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardlicensingknow-how

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation

This page was built for publication: Optimal know-how transfers in licensing contracts