Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks

DOI10.1007/S00712-016-0472-XzbMath1408.91141OpenAlexW2400847365MaRDI QIDQ1654094

Michela Cella, Federico Etro

Publication date: 7 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper328.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

oligopolyincentivesscreeninginvestmentstwo way distortion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Information sharing between vertical hierarchies

Cites Work

• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
• Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?^*
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Common Agency
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
• Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts

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