Dynamic tax evasion with audits based on visible consumption

DOI10.1007/S00712-016-0493-5zbMath1408.91160OpenAlexW2507823150MaRDI QIDQ1654110

Francesco Menoncin, Rosella Levaggi

Publication date: 7 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-016-0493-5

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic tax evasiontargeted auditsvisible consumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Hamilton-Jacobi theories (49L99)

Related Items (1)

Taxes, subsidies, regulation in dynamic models

Cites Work

• Tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context
• Tax audits, fines and optimal tax evasion in a dynamic context
• Optimal dynamic tax evasion
• Relative Concerns on Visible Consumption: A Source of Economic Distortions
• Financial Modelling with Jump Processes
• Applied stochastic control of jump diffusions

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