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Can CAESAR beat Galois? Robustness of CAESAR candidates against nonce reusing and high data complexity attacks

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Publication:1656066
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DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_25zbMath1440.94102OpenAlexW2806618168MaRDI QIDQ1656066

Damian Vizár, Serge Vaudenay

Publication date: 10 August 2018

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_25


zbMATH Keywords

authenticated encryptionkey recoveryforgeryCAESAR competitionbirthday boundnonce misusedecryption attack


Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)


Related Items (3)

Secure storage -- confidentiality and authentication ⋮ \textsc{Ascon} v1.2: lightweight authenticated encryption and hashing ⋮ Cryptanalysis of OCB2: attacks on authenticity and confidentiality




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