Security investment, hacking, and information sharing between firms and between hackers

DOI10.3390/G8020023zbMath1410.91064OpenAlexW2617664835MaRDI QIDQ1656936

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020023

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryinformation sharingpolicycontest success functionasset allocationcyber securitycyber warsecurity investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (6)

A competitive analysis of information security investment: the role of hacker attacks ⋮ When Hackers Err: The Impacts of False Positives on Information Security Games ⋮ Role of Intelligence Inputs in Defending Against Cyber Warfare and Cyberterrorism ⋮ Proactivity and Retroactivity of Firms and Information Sharing of Hackers ⋮ A two-period game theoretic model of zero-day attacks with stockpiling ⋮ Information Security Strategies for Information-Sharing Firms Considering a Strategic Hacker

Cites Work

• Interdependent security
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
• Information Sharing Among Cyber Hackers in Successive Attacks

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