Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty
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Publication:1656942
DOI10.3390/g8030025zbMath1410.91135OpenAlexW2661542186MaRDI QIDQ1656942
Lina Mallozzi, Roberta Messalli
Publication date: 13 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030025
Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)
Related Items (5)
On Stackelberg leader with min-max followers to solve fuzzy continuous static games ⋮ Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents ⋮ Emergent collaboration in social purpose games ⋮ On the computation of equilibria in monotone and potential stochastic hierarchical games ⋮ A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games
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